Lukas Püttmann    About    Research    Blog

Keeping records

I was thinking that few of us actually keep records of our written conversations. But then I remembered Stephen Wolfram’s “The Personal Analytics of My Life”:

I actually assumed lots of other people were [collecting personal data] too, but apparently they were not. And so now I have what is probably one of the world’s largest collections of personal data.

I have a complete archive of all my email going back to 1989.

Check out the figures.

Collected links

  1. Nature on the IPython notebook.

  2. FRED Adds 1,993 Banking and Monetary Statistics Series, 1914-1941 that is.

  3. Good post by Ricardo Hausmann on group identity.

  4. Ben Bernanke: “How do people really feel about the economy?”:

    In summary, the University of Michigan’s survey of consumer attitudes has shown a normal cyclical pattern of improvement in recent years, both in how people feel about their own economic prospects and in their expectations for the economy as a whole. In contrast, measures of the national “mood,” like Gallup’s “way things are going” question or questions about the “direction of the country,” show a high level of dissatisfaction.

    To an increasing extent, Americans are self-selecting into non-overlapping communities (real and virtual) of differing demographics and ideologies, served by a fragmented and partisan media.

  5. Corpus-based judicial opinions.

  6. Paul Krugman reviews the book by the former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King [source: The Browser]:

    In fact, King not-so-subtly mocks the authors of such books, which “share the same invisible subtitle: ‘how I saved the world.’”

    […] it is mainly an extended meditation on monetary theory and the methodology of economics.

    The more or less standard account of the 2008 crisis, which King shares, is that the combination of stability-fostered complacency and deregulation led to an accumulation of financial vulnerabilities. Private debt was on a steady upward trend before the crisis, […].

    People cope with this uncertainty by settling on “narratives” that are conventionally accepted at any given moment, but can suddenly change.

"What Is Code?", by Paul Ford

One of my favorite long-reads last year was “What Is Code?” by Paul Ford (emphasis added):

Your diligent decentralized team frequently writes new code that runs on the servers. So here’s a problem: What’s the best way to get that code onto those 50 computers? Click and drag with your mouse? God, no. What are you, an animal?

And that’s why everyone gets excited about GitHub. You should go to GitHub, you really should.

How Do You Pick a Programming Language? […] These are different problems. What do we need to do, how many times do we need to do it, and what existing code can we use to help us do it that many times? Ask those questions.

This is why the choice [of a programming language] is so hard. Everything can do everything, and people will tell you that you should use everything to do everything.

Related posts:

The Economist on GDP measurement and progress

Great article: “Measuring economies: The trouble with GDP”. (If it’s behind a paywall, try googling the title.)

Hans-Joachim Voth also discussed this.

I guess in the end, we need a certain fatalism. There are many ways we can try to adapt our estimates, but as Angus Deaton writes, the further two countries are away in time or structure (say Germany vs. Switzerland or Thailand vs. Kenya) the harder it becomes to compare the two in terms of production and prices in any meaningful way. It does not mean that we should stop trying to do better, but some fundamental gaps might simply not be bridged.

When testing isn't enough

Scientific code should be held to higher standards than other software. So it would help to write test cases that check if the outputs of our programs look plausible. But for some people, that’s not enough.

Yaron Minsky, who introduced the exotic programming language OCaml at the financial trading firm Jane Street, explains how they go about writing their sensitive systems:

We do an enormous amount of trading. There’s billions of dollars of nominal value kind of sloshing back and forth in the systems that we build. And what this means is, we are very nervous about technological risk. Because there is no faster way to light yourself on fire than to write a piece of software that makes the same bad decision over and over in a tight loop. (link)

He argues that on such a scale normal software testing isn’t enough, because even the very unlikely strange cases – that you haven’t thought about and written test cases for – might plausibly happen. So you have to understand the code really well and to make it readable, so that other people can check its correct functioning.

Only one inflation rate for the rich and the poor?

The story of GDP since 1940 is also the story of macroeconomics. (p20)

This is by Diane Coyle in her book “GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History”. Ever since the first Gross National Product (GNP) accounts were published for the United States in 1942, a great range of assumptions on what to include were necessary: Should we count services, the public sector or the financial sector? Ultimately these accounts are a social construct, so we need to decide which activities are worthwhile.

In macroeconomics, researchers have tried to get away from the model of the representative household by introducing heterogeneity among households. And similarly to these theoretical developments, new ideas for national accounts have been put forth: Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman propose (pdf) to start using “distributional national accounts”. Previously we could answer what the aggregate economy produces and consumes, but these new accounts promise to tell us: How much has income grown for somebody at a particular place in the income distribution?

There already exist some indicators for this question, such as the top 1% income share estimated from tax returns. But what’s new is to provide accounts that are consistent with the macro data.

It’s interesting to ponder over the question of how to convert nominal to real values for income groups. Should we use one inflation rate for everyone or a different inflation rate for every income bracket?

Richer people spend less on food and other items relatively to their total income than do poorer people. The German statistical office, for example, offers this tool (in German) to calculate personalized inflation rates. But there are good reasons for and against using a single inflation rate and our choice should depend on how we want to think about income:

  • Income as consumption. More income means you can buy and consume more goods now or in the future. Normally, this is what economists think of when they hear “income”.
  • Income as economic power. Being rich also comes with more influence, so income might be a good indicator for who’s powerful in society.

The first concept is probably better suited for international or intra-temporal comparisons. We might ask: “How much better off is somebody in Switzerland relative to somebody in Kenya?” or “How much better off is somebody in Germany now than compared to 1950?” And for both questions we probably want to take into account that prices differ in the two countries and have been different in the past.

But within a single country at one point in time, the second concept is likely more useful. If both rich and poor people generally live nearby, compete for the same resources and participate through the same political entity, then we should probably use the same price indicator for both groups.

So it seems to make sense to just use one inflation rate in the distributional national accounts. But how large is the dispersion in prices that people actually pay?

Greg Kaplan and Sam Schulhofer-Wohl (pdf) look at scanner data for the prices of sales transactions by households [source: MR]. They find great variation among the prices that people pay for similar goods and this effect even dominates the movements of the aggregate price level:

[…] almost all of the variability in a household’s inflation rate over time comes from variability in household-level prices relative to average prices for the same goods, not from variability in the aggregate inflation rate.

And even similar households pay different prices for the same goods:

Households with low incomes, more household members, or older household heads experience higher inflation on average, […], but these effects are small relative to the variance of the distribution, and observable household characteristics have little power overall to predict household inflation rates.

So something else, apart from income, dominates individual inflation rates.

This is based on 500 mio. transactions by 50,000 U.S. households between 2004 and 2013. Coyle also argues in her book for using “user-generated statistics” (p138) to improve our understanding of economic activity. But it’s a pity that the time dimension for this kind of data is relatively short.

It’s previously been found that relevant economic actors (managers of firms in New Zealand) know remarkably little about the aggregate inflation rate. Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl offer the intriguing explanation that the aggregate inflation rate might simply matter little to individuals as they face different prices anyway. This probably also holds implications about how central banks should think about the transmission of monetary policy.

However, Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl say it’s important to know whether people can forecast their own personal inflation rate. If they cannot, then people might keep looking at the aggregate inflation rate as the best predictor of where also their personal price level will be in the future.

Coyle argues in her book that though GDP has many imperfections, it’s still the best way to measure economic activity and that instead replacing it we should use a “dashboard of indicators” (p118):

The U.S. Commerce Department called GDP one of the greatest inventions of the twentieth century, and so it was. There is no replacement for it on the horizon. (p138)

Not a replacement, but the authors Piketty, Saez and Zucman have a good point that we should add the cross-sectional dimension to it. So let’s hope that statistical agencies will take over this task, through maintaining and publishing these distributional national accounts.

Diagnostic expectations

Why do financial crises happen?

That’s hard to answer, but we know that private credit tends to increase before the trouble starts. But why do people take on so much debt in the first place? Is it because of wrong-headed regulation or do people become too confident – for other reasons – about how much they will be able to repay in the future?

Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer propose a model in which households over-interpret streaks of good or bad news and extrapolate these into the future. They show that these psychological swings can help explain credit cycles and might be a source of economic fluctuations.

In the model, states of the world are represented by a random variable . The realizations determine the share of firms that will be productive – and repay their debts – in period .

The representative household saves by lending to firms and takes into account the probability that some firms will not repay. However, the authors distort the household’s expectation with a psychological bias they refer to as the representativeness heuristic. People tend to take properties that are more likely in one class than another to represent that class. So red hair is representative for the class “Irish”, even when dark hair is much more common in Ireland.

Agents take the change of their expectation of the future state as a sign for things to come. Biased agents judge the representativeness of state by comparing the true conditional distribution of the future state with the probability that a rational agent assigned to that state before the information on the current state has become available. The authors refer to this way of forming expectations as diagnostic expectations.

If the state of the economy is better than expected, then expectations about future states are revised upwards by more than what is justified by rational expectations. Households become too optimistic about firms’ ability to repay their debts and are happy to lend more. This reduces the interest rate and lets firms invest more. This leads to more production and thus an economic expansion. The effect works vice versa for bad news which makes the household overly pessimistic:

When times are good, households are optimistic about the future state of the economy. The perceived creditworthiness of firms is high, households supply more capital, the interest rate falls, firms issue more debt and invest more, and future output rises. When times turn sour, households cut lending, firms issue less debt and cut investment, and the economy contracts.

They don’t mention welfare, but households are obviously worse off than if they would accurately form expectations.

When we assume to follow an autoregressive process we can draw a series and simulate how rational expectations compare with diagnostic expectations:1

Diagnostic beliefs, Figure 2_1

Diagnostic expectations overshoot, so they are larger than rational expectations when times are good and below them when times are bad.

When we plot the difference between the two expectations we get:

Diagnostic beliefs, Figure 2_2

Where we can clearly see the psychological boom periods (green) and bust periods (orange).

In bad times, households are too pessimistic, so we can expect positive surprises. The same holds in good times: The households expects things to be good again, so he is too optimistic. This results in a negative correlation of forecasts errors with the current state:

Diagnostic beliefs, Figure 2_3

In total, this results in:

  • endogenous credit cycles and
  • larger macroeconomic volatility.

However, the signals that different people in the economy get have to be sufficiently correlated for this to matter in the aggregate. Is that realistic? If there is even a bit of heterogeneous uncertainty about which state the world is currently in, then some households might become optimistic and some pessimistic. Could this not lead to some averaging out of these effects?

Also what’s the policy implication here? Do maybe professional forecasters or central banks not make these mistakes and should they therefore inform or regulate the decision-making of households? Because we would actually much prefer if people did not form their beliefs like that. Robert Shiller writes this in his book:

We must consider how to deal with the change in thinking that leads people to think we have entered a new enlightenment, changes that, through their effect on market prices, impinge on all our lives.

We have to consider what we as individuals and as a society should be doing to offset some of the ill effects of this exuberance. (p203, “Irrational Exuberance”)

But he ends on:

Ultimately, in a free society, we cannot protect people from all the consequences of their own errors. (p230, “Irrational Exuberance”)

Also, must we assume that all people form their expectations like this? What if there are some clever investors that don’t have overshooting expectations? They might arbitrage the mispricing in firms’ bond prices away, right?

And who might those arbitrageurs be? People like Cliff Asness:

ASNESS: Second reason is a behavioral story. Someone out there is making a mistake. I gave you two. Underreaction and overreaction are both the behavioral story. They’re both somebody out there making an error, doesn’t mean markets are terrible by any means. I’m a big believer in markets but at the margin, they’re making an error and you take advantage of it.


COWEN: Let me give you my intuition in favor of why it might be overreaction and you tell me what you think. You receive a signal about the world. It’s to some extent a private signal and you over-interpret that signal and you think it’s a signal about the whole world so you overreact. That leads to some price movement, which is propagated through time. But, at least some people think, past that 12-month time window, momentum ceases, and there’s even a bit of price reversal. Eventually, you learn that you’ve been overreacting by thinking your private information is more general, more systematic than it is and then things snap back a bit. Does that psychological hypothesis explain this mix of price reversal in the longer term and momentum in the shorter term? Do you think that makes sense or not?


ASNESS: Let me take this another way. I think we are mixing overconfidence with overreaction a little bit. New news, people might be overconfident in how much they understand it, but they don’t seem to incorporate it enough.

Yes, there exist limits to arbitrage for various reasons, but it would be nice if we didn’t have to assume these for the real effects of diagnostic expectations to go through.

I like how the authors relate their mechanism to the literature on “financial shocks”:

When the economy is hit by a series of good news, investors holding diagnostic expectations become excessively optimistic, fueling as in the current model excessive credit expansion. During such a credit expansion households would pay insufficient attention to the possibility of a bust. As fundamentals stabilize, the initial excess optimism unwinds, bringing this possibility to investors’ minds. The economy would appear to be hit by a “financial shock”: a sudden, seemingly unjustified, increase in credit spreads. Agents would appear to have magically become more risk averse: they now take into account the crash risk they previously neglected.

And this bit:

Perhaps as important an advantage of our approach is that expectations are not delinked from news, but rather follow a distorted true process of the data, what we have referred to as the “kernel of truth” hypothesis.

To conclude, the paper provides a theoretical explanation how overshooting expectations due to the representativeness heuristic can cause financial and macroeconomic cycles.

  1. The codes for reproducing Figure 2 from the paper are here